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Abstract 
When a cue reliably predicts an outcome, the associability of that cue will change. 
Associative theories of learning propose this change will persist even when the same cue is 
paired with a different outcome. These theories, however, do not extend the same privilege to 
an outcome; an outcome’s learning history is deemed to have no bearing on subsequent new 
learning involving that outcome. Two experiments were conducted which sought to 
investigate this assumption inherent in these theories using a serial letter-prediction task. In 
both experiments participants were exposed, in Stage 1, to a predictable outcome (‘X’) and an 
unpredictable outcome (‘Z’). In Stage 2 participants were exposed to the same outcomes 
preceded by novel cues which were equally predictive of both outcomes. Both experiments 
revealed that participants’ learning toward the previously predictable outcome was more 
rapid in Stage 2 than the previously unpredicted outcome. The implications of these results 
for theories of associative learning are discussed. 
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When a predictive relationship is arranged between two stimuli, an association 
between these stimuli is assumed to be formed (e.g. Mackintosh, 1974, 1983; Pavlov, 1927; 
Rescorla, 1968). In order to explain the mechanisms underpinning the formation and 
subsequent modification of this association, a variety of formal learning models have been 
devised (see: Pearce & Bouton, 2001, for review). Generally, these models can be categorised 
into two types: unconditioned stimulus (US) processing models, and conditioned stimulus 
(CS) processing models. According to the first class of these models, the US is capable of 
supporting a finite amount of associative strength which is divided amongst the CSs, or cues, 
presented prior to the presentation of a US, or an outcome.1 One of the most influential of 
these models was proposed by Rescorla and Wagner (1972). This model states that the 
change in the associative strength of a stimulus (∆V) is determined by the following equation: 
 
																							∆ܸ = α β (λ -  ∑ܸ)    (1) 
 
Where α and β are learning rate parameters for the cue and the outcome, respectively, 
which are fixed, and are determined by the salience of these two stimuli; λ represents the 
maximum amount of conditioning supported by the outcome, and ∑V is the summed 
associative strength of all cues present on a trial. Informally, the model proposes that 
associative learning will be most effective between cues and outcomes that are 
unconditionally salient and, in particular, when the outcome is unexpected – and hence better 
processed.  
Alternatively, CS processing models or “attentional models”, assume that the 
predictability of a cue influences its associability (i.e. the extent to which it enters into 
                                                 
1 The terms cue and conditioned stimulus (CS), and outcome and unconditioned stimulus (US) are 
used interchangeably 
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associations). One of the most influential of these models was proposed by Mackintosh 
(1975). Within this model, henceforth the ‘Mackintosh model’, the change in the associative 
strength of a stimulus e.g. ‘A’ (∆ܸA) is determined by the following equation:  
 
∆ܸA = αA β (λ - VA)                            (2) 
 
Here, ߙA refers to the associability of stimulus A, β is, again, a fixed learning-rate 
parameter determined by the salience of the outcome, and λ the asymptotic value of learning 
possible on that trial. Crucially, within this model the parameter α is deemed to alter as a 
function of experience: Stimulus A will gain in associability if it is a better predictor of an 
outcome than all other stimuli present on a given trial, otherwise the associability of A will 
decrease. These rules can be expressed in the following formulae:  
 
∆ߙA >	0 if |ߣ − ܸA| < |ߣ − ܸr|    (3) 
∆ߙA <	0 if |ߣ − ܸA| > |ߣ − ܸr|    (4) 
 
In which ∆ߙA is the change in the associability of stimulus A; λ − ܸA is the difference 
between the asymptotic value and the associative strength of stimulus A, and λ − ܸr is the 
discrepancy between the asymptotic value and the associative strength of all cues present on 
that trial, apart from A (that is to say, the remainder). 
A large body of evidence in both human (e.g. Bonardi, Graham, Hall, & Mitchell, 
2005; Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003; Livesey & McLaren, 2007) and non-human animals (e.g.: 
Haselgrove, Esber, Pearce & Jones, 2010; Mackintosh & Little, 1969) has supported the 
notion that a cue’s predictive history alters its associability. This phenomenon is 
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demonstrated in humans by the ‘learned predictiveness’ effect. In a typical learned 
predictiveness experiment, participants are exposed, in Stage 1, to a set of cues, some of 
which are reliable predictors of an outcome and some of which are unreliable predictors of an 
outcome. In Stage 2, these cues are arranged in a manner which makes them equally reliable 
predictors of novel outcomes. What is typically observed in such experiments is a bias in 
learning during Stage 2 to the cues that had greater predictive history in Stage 1; this effect is 
apparent when the cues are presented in isolation (Le Pelley, Turnbull, Reimers & Knipe, 
2010) or in compound with other cues (e.g. Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003).  
An assumption inherent in the Mackintosh model, and which is demonstrated in 
learned predictiveness experiments, is that variations in a cue’s associability will persist 
despite the cue being separated from the outcome with which the cue was initially established 
as either a good, or poor predictor. Thus, cue processing is, to a degree (Le Pelley, Oakeshott, 
Wills & McLaren, 2005), independent of the outcome. Interestingly, however, this 
independence of processing is not granted to the outcome. First, the learning rate parameter 
for the outcome, β, is fixed, being determined only by its unconditioned properties (e.g. its 
salience). Second, whilst the extent to which the outcome can support learning can change as 
a function of how surprising it is (e.g. Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), this variation is dependent 
on the presence of the cue which established the predictability of the outcome (e.g. λ-ΣV in 
Equation 1). Hence, variations in outcome processing are deemed to be cue-dependent.  
This approach is not unique to the Mackintosh model. Other, well established and 
more recent hybrid models, (e.g. Esber & Haselgrove, 2011; Le Pelley, 2004; Pearce & Hall, 
1980), also assume that learned variations in processing of the outcome is either non-existent 
or cue-dependent. This assumption within these models appears reasonable, whilst it makes 
sense for a cue to undergo changes in associability as a result of its predictive history, it is 
less clear why an outcome would experience associability changes as a result of its past 
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predictability. When a cue is presented, for instance, it can signal the absence or presence of 
an event, thus learning about the predictive nature of a cue is beneficial to an organism as it 
allows the organism to anticipate the event. Yet, when an outcome is presented the event has 
already happened, therefore it is difficult to see why a mechanism which mediates 
associability changes of an outcome would be necessary.  
Nevertheless, a number of phenomena within the learning literature have 
demonstrated that prior experience with an outcome can influence subsequent behaviour 
involving that outcome. For example, a number of studies within both the human and animal 
literature have reported variations in the response produced by an outcome as a consequence 
of how well-predicted it  has been in the past (see Marcos & Redondo, 2001). Interestingly, 
establishing an outcome as predictable has produced both diminution (i.e. attenuated 
responses; see Kimble & Ost, 1961; Marcos & Redondo, 1999) and facilitation (i.e. enhanced 
responding; see Donegan, & Wagner, 1987). A range of explanations have been provided for 
these effects; typically, however, these explanations invoke variations in the effectiveness of 
the outcome as a function of the presence (or absence) of the cue (λ-ΣV). Thus, no appeal to 
any change in cue-independent variations in outcome processing has been required.  
Additional phenomena within the learning literature have also suggested that exposure 
to an outcome can influence subsequent learning involving that outcome. One such 
phenomenon is the US pre-exposure effect, where exposure to the US, prior to CS-US 
pairings, impairs subsequent learning supported by that US (e.g. Kremer, 1971; see Randich 
& LoLordo, 1979, for review). This effect has been demonstrated in humans (Taylor, 1956) 
and rats (Kamin, 1961). This finding has been understood in terms of context blocking  (e.g. 
Baker & Mercier, 1982), according to which pre-exposure with the US results in the 
formation of an association between the context  and the US, permitting the context to 
compete with the CS for associative strength on subsequent CS-US trials. This account has 
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received much support (e.g. Baker & Mackintosh, 1979), however, notably, Baker and 
Mercier (1982), came to the conclusion that whilst the context may mediate the US pre-
exposure effect, it is also conceivable that during pre-exposure to the US, learning is acquired 
regarding the unpredictable nature of the US, which influences subsequent learning in Stage 2 
(See also: Randich & Lolordo, 1979). That is, the outcome is coded as unpredictable, thus 
impairing the formation of predictive relationships (associations) between the CS and this US 
at a subsequent stage. This latter explanation would seem to indicate that previous exposures 
to the US could potentially change the associability of the outcome itself regardless of the 
cue, or context, which it is was trained with.   
Similarly, Baker and Mackintosh (1977) demonstrated that when a CS and US are 
presented in an uncorrelated manner, these presentations impair subsequent conditioning 
between the two stimuli. This ‘learned irrelevance’ effect has been accounted for by 
assuming that these uncorrelated pre-exposures result in the CS and the US being deemed 
‘irrelevant’ (e.g. Baker & Mackintosh, 1979). However, this interpretation has been 
challenged. Matzel, Schachtman and Miller (1988) suggested that the deficit in learning is 
underpinned by pre-exposure to the CS, pre-exposure to the US, and a learned irrelevance 
effect. Furthermore, Bonardi and Ong (2003; also see Bonardi & Hall, 1996), in a review of 
the literature, concluded that there is no evidence of a genuine learned irrelevance effect 
above and beyond the effects of CS and US pre-exposure. The phenomena discussed above 
imply that previous experience with an outcome can influence subsequent learning involving 
that outcome. However, there is scant support for the idea that these changes in the extent to 
which an outcome can support learning persist in the absence of the cue with which the 
outcome was initially trained, or indeed beyond standard associative learning phenomena 
(e.g. context blocking, or latent inhibition). To date, only one study, in humans, has explored 
whether the predictability of an outcome can influence subsequent learning about novel cues 
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paired with this outcome. In this study, Griffiths, Mitchell, Bethmont, and Lovibond (2015) 
adapted a food allergist procedure where participants were required to identify foods (i.e. 
cues) that produced certain illnesses (i.e. outcomes). The results of this study revealed that 
participants displayed impaired learning about an illness (i.e. the outcome) which had been 
unreliably predicted in the past relative to an illness which had been well-predicted in the 
past. 
 In light of the potential theoretical significance of the data reported by Griffiths et al. 
(2015), the current experiments explored the generality of this effect with a serial letter-
prediction procedure, in which participants were tasked with learning the predictive 
relationships between certain target letters. This experimental procedure has been 
successfully used in a range of studies of learned variations of cue processing (e.g. Evans, 
Gray & Snowden, 2007; Granger, Moran, Buckley & Haselgrove, 2016; Young, Kumari, 
Mehrotra, Hemsley, Andrew, Sharma, Williams & Gray, 2005) and permits measurements of 
learning derived from both rating scales and response times. The aim of the current 
experiments was to assess whether the prior predictability of outcomes influenced the rate at 
which they were learned about, when subsequently predicted by novel cues. If the associative 
history of an outcome produces an effect comparable to a learned predictiveness effect, it 
would be expected that a previously well-predicted outcome would be learned about more 
readily than a previously less well-predicted outcome. Such a finding would constitute a 
conceptual replication of the results reported by Griffiths et al. (2015) and a major challenge 
to a central assumption of many associative models of learning.  
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Experiment 1  
Experiment 1 comprised a serial letter-prediction task in which participants were 
required to make a response to certain target letters or ‘outcomes’. The design of Experiment 
1 can be seen in Table 1. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
TABLE 1 HERE 
--------------------------------------- 
 
In Stage 1, letters X and Z were established as a well-predicted and a less well-
predicted target stimulus, respectively (referred to henceforth as the predicted outcome, and 
the unpredicted outcome) and participants were asked to respond either upon their 
presentation or beforehand if they thought they could anticipate their presentation. To 
establish one letter (e.g. X) as a predicted outcome, this letter was only ever preceded by one 
other letter (e.g. P). To establish an outcome as being unpredictable (e.g. Z), three letters (F, 
G and W) preceded this outcome with equal frequency. In Stage 1 the letters F, G and W also 
preceded the letters S and H an equal number of times. These trials, in which F, G and W 
were paired with S and H, served three purposes. First, they ensured that the unpredicted 
outcome was in fact unpredictable. Without these trials Z would merely have a greater 
number of predictors. Second, these trials ensured that S and H (which would serve as cues 
for X and Z in Stage 2) were familiarised to participants prior to the crucial test stage. And 
third, these trials served as non-target trials during which participants were not required to 
make a response.    
Stage 2 followed seamlessly from Stage 1. Here, trials in which P was paired with X, 
and trials in which F, G and W were paired with Z continued to be presented. In addition, 
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however, H and S were now paired equally frequently with X and Z respectively. The 
question of central interest was whether participants would come to acquire a more rapid 
response time to H (which was paired with the previously predicted outcome, X) than to S 
(which was paired with the previously unpredicted outcome, Z). Additional non-target trials 
were also included in Stage 2 in which F, G and W preceded each other equally frequently. 
11 
 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two participants (18 Females; 14 Males) were recruited from the University of 
Nottingham’s School of Psychology. Participants ranged from 19 – 51 years of age (M = 
23.8; SEM = 1.40). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants 
received course credit for their participation. The study was conducted in accordance with the 
British Psychological Society (2009) guidelines, receiving institutional ethical approval from 
the University of Nottingham’s Psychology ethics committee.  
Apparatus and Stimuli  
All stimuli were presented (and responses recorded) in the graphical experimental 
software package PsychoPy2, v1.82.02 (see Peirce, 2007; Peirce 2008), running on Windows 
7 on a standard desktop computer. The stimuli were white capital letters, Arial [7mm × 5mm; 
h × w], which appeared in the centre of the screen [27cm × 46cm; h × w] against a grey 
background. The stimulus letters were, ‘F’, ‘G’, ‘H’, ‘P’, ‘S’ and ‘W’. The target stimuli [i.e. 
the outcomes] were ‘X’ and ‘Z’. The actual stimulus letters which served as the cues, 
outcomes, and non-target trials were counterbalanced across experimental versions using a 
Latin-Squared counterbalancing technique. Stimulus letters never appeared simultaneously 
on screen. 
Procedure  
All participants were tested individually. Once participants had provided their consent 
they read the following instructions on screen before being exposed to Stage 1:  
“Thank you for participating in this experiment. 
In this experiment you will see individual letters appear in the centre of the screen. 
It is your job to press X when you see X appear and press Z when you see Z appear. At first 
you will only be able to respond to these letters when you see them, but as the experiment 
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continues, you might be able to anticipate when they are going to be presented. If you think 
you know when either X or Z are going to appear, you can press them BEFORE they are 
presented.  
Please try to respond as quickly as you can when you think you know when X or Z are 
going to appear. If you have no questions, please have your fingers ready over the X and the 
Z, and then press the space bar to begin the experiment.” 
Stage 1 
In Stage 1, participants were exposed to 6 blocks of 12 trials (72 trials in total) in 
which a trial constituted a pairing of two stimuli. Trial order was block randomised, and there 
was no break between blocks. In each block participants received 3 pairings of P and X, 1 
pairing each of F, G, and W with Z ; and 1 pairing each of F, G, and W with S and 1 pairing 
each of F, G and W with H. Each trial lasted 4 seconds. On a target trial, for example, a cue 
would be presented (e.g. P) for 1 second, followed by an inter-stimulus interval of 1 second, 
an outcome (e.g. X) of 1 second, and finally a 1 second interval before the next cue was 
presented (see Figure 1). In total, Stage 1 lasted 4.8 min. Once all 72 trials were complete, 
Stage 2 began. There was no break between the two stages.  
Stage 2 
In Stage 2 participants were exposed to 18 blocks of 16 trials, the order of which was 
randomised within each block. In this stage the trials which established the predictability of 
the outcomes were carried over from Stage 1in order to make the two stages more similar. 
Thus, in each block participants received 3 pairings of P and X and 1 pairing each of F, G, 
and W with Z. In addition, H and S were each paired with the predicted and unpredicted 
outcomes (e.g. X and Z) respectively, for two trials; and F, G and W were paired with each 
other to form 6 non-target trials for each block. In total Stage 2 lasted 19.2 min.  
 
13 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
--------------------------------------- 
 
Scoring and Error Classification  
Response times could range from 0 – 3 seconds. Responses made between 0 – 1 
seconds indicated that participants were responding during the presentation of the cue letter 
(e.g. the letter P in a P–X pairing). Responses between 1 – 2 seconds indicated that 
participants were responding during the inter-stimulus interval following the presentation of 
the cue. Responses between 2–3 seconds indicated that participants were responding to the 
outcomes as they were presented (X or Z). Response times were only analysed for P-X and 
F/G/W-Z trials in Stage 1, and on H-X and S-Z trials in Stage 2. If participants omitted a 
response (i.e. they failed to press the respective outcome key [e.g. X or Z] within the 0–3 
second window) they were allocated a response time of 3 seconds for the trial. This type of 
error was classed as an ‘omission’. If participants made an erroneous prediction (e.g. by 
selecting the letter X when in fact Z was the outcome), they would also be allocated a 
response time of 3 seconds. This type of error was classed as a 'commission’.  
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Results and Discussion 
 
       --------------------------------------- 
                                                FIGURE 2 HERE 
                                       --------------------------------------- 
 
Response Time Data 
Figure 2 shows the mean response time to the predicted and unpredicted outcomes in 
Stage 1 across the 18 trials. The predicted stimulus refers to the outcome (e.g. X) which was 
reliably paired with one cue (e.g. P); the unpredicted stimulus refers to the outcome (e.g. Z) 
which was preceded by three letters (F/G/W). The response times for these data were collated 
by looking at responses to the target stimuli within the 0-3 second window beginning 
immediately upon the presentation of the cue that preceded the targets. Inspection of the data 
reveals that as training progressed, response times for the predicted outcome shortened. 
Furthermore, from Trial 6 onwards participants were, on average, responding to the outcome 
prior to its presentation. In contrast, response times to the unpredicted outcome stayed 
relatively constant across all 18 trials, with participants, on average, responding to the 
outcome only during its presentation. This impression was confirmed with a 2 x 18 repeated 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) of individual response times with the variables of 
outcome (Unpredicted vs Predicted) and trial (1 – 18); in light of sphericity violations for the 
“trial” variable, χ2 (152) = 259.55, p < .001 and the interaction between trial and outcome, 
χ2 (152) = 215.50, p < .001, Greenhouse-Geisser values are reported.2 The ANOVA revealed 
significant main effects of outcome, F (1, 31) = 20.71, MSE = 4.26, p = < .001, 2Pη  = .40, and 
                                                 
2 Greenhouse-Geisser values are reported for all appropriate analyses where epsilon is less than .75 
(see Field, 2009). However, for ease of readability, corrected degrees of freedom are rounded to 
nearest whole number. 
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trial, F (8, 253) = 13.48, MSE = .50, p = < .001, 2
Pη  = .30, and a significant interaction 
between the two variables, F (8, 259) = 6.12; MSE = .47, p = < .001, 2
Pη  =.17. Simple main-
effects analyses revealed no significant differences between the outcomes for trials 1 - 4, 
smallest, F (1, 31) = 2.27, MSE = .04, p = .14, but a significant difference for all other trials, 
smallest F (1, 31) = 5.68, MSE = .51, p = .02.  
 
      --------------------------------------- 
                                                FIGURE 3 HERE 
                                      --------------------------------------- 
 
Figure 3 shows the mean response times to the predicted and unpredicted outcomes in 
Stage 2, on trials when the outcomes were reliably, and equivalently, predicted by cues H and 
S. The data in Figure 3 have been collapsed into 9 blocks, each comprising 4 trials. In 
keeping with Stage 1, the response time data for these analyses were collated by looking at 
responses within the 0-3 second window following the onset of cue H or S. Figure 3 
demonstrates that despite both outcomes initially producing similar mean response times on 
the first block, response times to the previously predicted outcome became faster than the 
previously unpredicted outcome. These impressions were confirmed with a 2 x 9 repeated 
measures ANOVA of individual response times with the variables of outcome (unpredicted 
vs predicted) and block (1 – 9), which revealed significant main effects of outcome, F (1, 31) 
= 4.86, MSE = 1.54, p < .05, 2
Pη  = .14, and block, F (4, 105) = 30.60, MSE = .46, p < .001, 2Pη  
= .50. The interaction between these variables was not significant, F (4, 115) = 2.05, MSE = 
.31, p = .09, 2
Pη  = .06. Overall, these results demonstrate that the previously predicted 
outcome was learned about at a faster rate than the unpredicted outcome. 
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Error Data    
The mean percentage of errors for the predicted and the unpredicted outcome was 
calculated for both Stage 1 and Stage 2. The Stage 1 error counts were calculated by 
analysing the number of errors committed on the P–X trials for the predicted outcome and the 
F/G/W–Z trials for the unpredicted outcome. Inspection of these data revealed that a 
relatively low percentage of errors were committed for both the predicted outcome (M = 
3.81%, SEM = 1.65) and the unpredicted outcome (M = 3.65%, SEM = 1.05). Participants 
also made comparable percentages of omissions (M = 3.21%, SEM = .88) and commissions 
(M = 4.25%, SEM = 1.82). A 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA of individual percent errors 
with the variables of outcome (predicted vs unpredicted) and error type (omission vs. 
commission) revealed no main effect of outcome, F (1, 31) = .01, MSE = 70.66, p = .91, 2
Pη = 
.00, no effect of Error Type, F (1, 31) = .46, MSE = 75.54, p = .50 2
Pη  = .02, and no 
interaction between these two variables, F (1, 31) = .88, MSE = 69.69, p = .35 2
Pη = .03.  
The Stage 2 error counts were calculated by analysing the number of errors 
committed on the H – X and S – Z trials. Inspection of these data revealed that participants, 
again, made relatively few errors for both the predicted (M = 5.56%, SEM = 1.87) and 
unpredicted outcome (M = 4.03%, SEM = 1.12) in this stage. As in Stage 1, slightly more 
commissions (M = 5.60%, SEM = 2.09) were committed than omissions (M = 3.99%, SEM = 
.89). An identical ANOVA to that conducted upon the percentage error data from Stage 1 
was conducted upon the data from Stage 2. This analysis revealed no main effect of outcome, 
F (1, 31) = 1.77, MSE = 41.82, p = .19, 2
Pη = .05, no effect of error type, F (1, 31) = .55, MSE 
= 151.04, p = .47 2
Pη  = .02, and no interaction between these two variables, F (1, 31) = 1.22, 
MSE = 35.87, p = .28 2
Pη = .04.  
Experiment 1 demonstrated that establishing outcomes as differentially predicted, 
altered the extent to which these outcomes subsequently supported learning to new cues. 
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Following learning about P–X and F/G/W–Z in Stage 1, participants displayed faster overall 
learning to the predicted outcome (H–X) in Stage 2 than the unpredicted outcome (S–Z). 
These results pose a challenge to attentional-theories of learning which do not grant an 
independence of processing to outcomes (Esber & Haselgrove, 2011; Le Pelley, 2004; 
Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). These models assume 
that when a previously learned-about outcome is separated from the cue which established 
the predictability of the outcome, the associative history of the outcome should not influence 
subsequent learning. However, the results of Experiment 1 appear to contradict this 
assumption.  
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Experiment 2  
Although the results of Experiment 1 are consistent with the suggestion that outcomes 
can come to acquire differential associability as a consequence of being either well or poorly 
predicted in the past, it is possible to develop an alternative explanation for these results from 
the perspective of standard associative models of learning. During Stage 1, participants were 
given trials in which F, G and W, were each paired with Z: trials which may have resulted in 
the establishment of excitatory associations between each of these stimuli and Z. On other 
trials, F, G and W, are paired with H, and on other trials with S. Consequently, on these 
F/G/W-H or F/G/W-S trials there may have been an expectation of the presentation of Z 
which, importantly, was always unfulfilled. These circumstances are precisely those which 
standard models of associative learning (e.g. Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) predict will result in 
the establishment of an inhibitory association between H and Z, and S and Z. This inhibition 
will then have to be overcome on trials in which S and Z are paired in Stage 2, before the 
acquisition of excitatory associative learning between these stimuli can be expressed. Thus 
the S-Z training will appear to be less successful than the H-X training, which was precisely 
the result observed in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 sought to rule out this alternative 
explanation for the results of Experiment 1, by arranging the stimuli in a manner which 
would circumvent any differential inhibitory association being formed between the stimuli 
which served as the test cues in Stage 2 (H and S) and the unpredicted outcome during Stage 
1. 
 The strategy in Experiment 2 was to employ a design where H and S were never 
preceded by F, G or W. Thus, there was no opportunity for an unfulfilled expectation of Z to 
be present during trials featuring H and S, and consequently the establishment of inhibition. 
We were, however, still keen to familiarise participants with H and S before they were 
established as cues for Z and X. We therefore presented trials in which these stimuli were 
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paired with each other in Stage 1 (i.e.: S–H and H-S). As in Experiment 1, non-target trials 
were again formed by pairing the F, G and W stimuli with each other (as in Stage 2 of 
Experiment 1). The full design of Experiment 2 can be seen in Table 2. If the effect observed 
in Experiment 1 is still present using this design, this would suggest that any impaired 
performance involving the unpredicted outcome in Stage 2 was not solely underpinned by an 
inhibitory association between the previously unpredicted outcome (e.g. Z) and its novel cue 
(e.g. S) during Stage 1 training. In addition, following completion of Stage 2, a set of rating 
scales were presented which required participants to rate how predictive each stimulus was of 
the target stimuli (X and Z). If these scales are consistent with the response time data in 
Experiment 1, it would be expected that the cue (S) which was paired with the previously 
unpredicted outcome (Z), would be rated as being less predictive than the cue (H) which was 
paired with the previously predicted outcome (X).     
 
     --------------------------------------- 
                                                   TABLE 2 HERE 
                                         --------------------------------------- 
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Method 
Participants  
Thirty-two participants (29 Females; 3 Males) were recruited from the University of 
Nottingham’s School of Psychology. Participants ranged from 18 – 46 years of age (M = 
20.2; SEM = 0.89). Participants received course credit for their participation. A cash prize of 
£10 was also awarded to the participant who completed the experiment with the fastest 
overall reaction time on trials where the target stimuli were present. All other details were the 
same as in Experiment 1.  
Apparatus and Stimuli 
The apparatus and stimuli for Experiment 2 were identical to Experiment 1. However 
once Stage 2 had been completed participants were presented with two ratings screens, one 
for each of the target stimuli (X and Z). These screens requested participants provide a rating 
for each stimulus’s (i.e. ‘F’ ‘G’ ‘H’ ‘P’ ‘S’ and ‘W’) ability to predict the absence or presence 
of the target stimuli on a scale ranging from ‘-100’ to ‘+100’ [‘-100’ = ‘Predicts absence of 
target stimulus’; ‘0’ = ‘Don’t Know’ ‘+100’ = ‘Predicts presence of target stimulus’]. Six 
rating scales for each of the letters appeared on the same screen at the same time, for each 
rating screen. Each of the six scales was placed alongside each of the respective letters.  
Procedure  
The procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1, with the exception 
that the letters (H and S) which would serve as cues for X and Z in Stage 2 were paired with 
each other in Stage 1 twice per block (i.e. H–S, S–H). Thus, these pairings were presented a 
total of 12 times across Stage 1. Within Stage 1, the stimuli F, G and W, were also paired 
with each other to form non-target trials (e.g. F–G, F–W, G–F, G–W, W–F and W-G), as in 
Stage 2 of Experiment 1. These pairings were each presented once in each block, thus being 
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presented a total of 36 times across Stage 1. In total Stage 1 lasted 5.6 mins.  The procedure 
for Stage 2 was identical to Stage 2 of Experiment 1. 
Once participants had completed Stage 2 they were presented with the following text: 
“Thank you. The experiment is nearly complete. Before finishing, however, there are a few 
questions to complete. Please press the ‘SPACEBAR’ to proceed.” Participants were then 
presented with a rating screen for each of the target stimuli (X and Z). Participants then 
provided a score ranging from -100 to + 100 regarding how predictive of the absence or 
presence of X or Z each other letter was. Participants provided their score by adjusting a tick 
maker on a scale. The numerical value of the tick marker position was provided in a grey box 
beneath the scale. The order of the rating screens was counterbalanced between participants.  
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Results and Discussion  
 
     --------------------------------------- 
                                                FIGURE 4 HERE 
                                         --------------------------------------- 
 
Response Time Data 
Figure 4 shows the mean response time to the predicted and unpredicted outcomes in 
Stage 1 across the 18 trials.  In keeping with Experiment 1, the response times for these data 
were collated by looking at responses within the 0 – 3 second window beginning with the 
presentation of the cue. Inspection of the data presented in Figure 4 reveals that as training 
progressed, response times for the predicted outcome shortened. Furthermore, Figure 4 
demonstrates that from Trial 7 onward participants were, on average, responding to the 
predicted outcome before its presentation. In contrast, response times to the unpredicted 
outcome stayed relatively constant across all 18 trials, with participants, on average, 
responding to the outcome only when the outcome had been presented.    
A 2 x 18 repeated measures ANOVA was performed on these data with the variables 
of outcome (Unpredicted vs Predicted) and trial (1 – 18). The ANOVA revealed significant 
main effects of outcome, F (1, 31) = 55.23, MSE = 2.19, p = < .001, 2
Pη  = .64, and trial, F (8, 
247) = 15.5, MSE = .40, p = < .001, 2
Pη  = .34, and a significant interaction between these 
variables, F (8, 242) = 10.74, MSE = .40, p = < .001, 2
Pη  =.26. Simple main-effects analyses 
revealed significant differences between the outcomes (ps < .05) from Trial 2 onward, 
excluding Trial 4, F (1, 31) = 3.45, p = .07 and Trial 5, F (1, 31) = 3.63, p = .06.  
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     --------------------------------------- 
                                                FIGURE 5 HERE 
                                         --------------------------------------- 
 
Figure 5 shows, over 9 four-trial blocks, the mean response times to the predicted and 
unpredicted outcomes in Stage 2, on trials when the outcomes from Stage 1were both reliably 
and equivalently predicted by cues H and S. In keeping with Experiment 1, response times 
were similar for both the previously predicted and unpredicted outcomes at the outset of 
Stage 2. However, overall, response times to the previously predicted outcome from Stage 
1were faster than the unpredicted outcome from Stage 1.   
A 2 x 9 repeated measures ANOVA was performed on these data with the variables of 
outcome (Unpredicted vs Predicted) and block (1 – 9). The ANOVA revealed significant 
main effects of outcome, F (1, 31) = 8.08, MSE = 1.56, p < .01, 2
Pη  = .21, and block, F (3, 
92) = 41.54, MSE = .57, p < .001, 2
Pη  = .57. The interaction effect between the two factors 
approached significance, F (3, 106) = 2.34, MSE = .28, p = .07, 2
Pη
 = .07. For the curious 
reader, simple main effects analyses were conducted to identify the source of the interaction 
which approached significance. These analyses revealed significant differences between the 
outcomes (ps < .05) on Blocks 2 - 7. There were no significant differences on blocks 1, 8 or 
9, largest F (1, 31) = 2.79, p = .11.  
Error Data  
As in Experiment 1, the mean percentage of errors for the predicted and the 
unpredicted outcome was calculated for both Stage 1 and Stage 2 data. Inspection of the data 
from Stage 1 revealed that participants made more errors for the unpredicted outcome (M = 
5.82, SEM = 1.31) than the predicted outcome (M = 3.56, SEM = 1.16) and more 
commissions (M = 6.16, SEM = 1.49) than omissions (M = 3.21, SEM = .99). These 
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impressions were largely confirmed with a 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA of percentage of 
errors with the variables of outcome (unpredicted vs predicted) and error type (commission 
vs omission). The ANOVA revealed a main effect of outcome F (1, 31) = 6.2, MSE = 24.61, 
p = .02, 2Pη  = .18. The main effect of error type approached significance, F (1, 31) = 3.42, 
MSE = 81.62, p = .07, 2Pη  
 = .10. There was no significant interaction between these two 
factors, F (1, 31) = .118; MSE = 32.73, p = .73, 2Pη  =.00.  
Inspection of the Stage 2 data revealed that participants made a comparable number of 
errors for the predicted outcome (M = 5.43, SEM = 1.45) and the unpredicted outcome (M = 
4.69, SEM = 1.68), with more commissions (M = 6.90, SEM = 1.62) than omissions (M = 
3.21, SEM = 1.51). An identical ANOVA to that conducted on the error data from Stage 
1was conducted on the Stage 2 data which revealed a main effect of error type, F (1, 31) = 
4.83, MSE = 90.17, p = .04, 2Pη = .14, but no effect of outcome F (1, 31) = 1.31, MSE = 13.31, 
p = .26, 2Pη = .04, and no interaction, F (1, 31) = .08, MSE = 61.75, p = .78, 2Pη  = .00.   
 
 
 
 
     --------------------------------------- 
                                                FIGURE 6 HERE 
                                         --------------------------------------- 
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Rating Data          
 Figure 6 shows participants’ ratings of how predictive they deemed each of the cues 
to be for the target outcomes (X or Z). The ratings for the three stimuli paired with the 
unpredicted outcome in Stage 1 (e.g. ‘F’, ‘G’, ‘W’) were collapsed by averaging the values 
for these stimuli. Four participants failed to provide ratings, either omitting some or all of the 
rating scales; an additional participant was removed as their ratings were more than 3 
standard deviations above the mean (Z score > 3.27), closer inspection of their ratings 
indicated they used the scale in the opposite manner in which it was intended. Thus, a total of 
5 participants were omitted from the subsequent analyses (n = 27).  
As can be seen in Figure 6, the ‘P–X’ ratings and ‘H–X’ ratings were comparably 
high, and both higher than the ‘S–Z’ rating. The three stimuli (‘F/G/W’) paired with the 
unpredicted outcome (‘Z’) received only a mildly positive rating. A repeated measures one-
way ANOVA of individual ratings with four levels (P–X, F/G/W–Z, H–X, and S–Z) was 
significant, F (2, 56) = 41.62, MSE = 2074.94, p < .001, 2
Pη = .62. Planned comparisons using 
Bonferonni corrected t-tests (adjusted p = .025) revealed a significant difference between the 
predictiveness ratings for the stimulus pairings P-X and F/G/W – Z, t(26) = 9.01, p <. 001, 
and a significant difference between H–X and S–Z, t(26) = 2.86, p <. 01. These results 
corroborate the response time data from Stage 2: participants were biased towards learning 
about the cue paired with the previously predicted outcome (H–X) relative to the cue paired 
with the previously unpredicted outcome (S–Z).  
Experiment 2 replicated and extended the findings of Experiment 1, again 
demonstrating that the previous predictability of an outcome influences the rate at which it is 
subsequently learned about when signaled by a cue which it has not previously been paired 
with. These results were obtained using an experimental design that ruled out the contribution 
of inhibitory learning that may be employed to explain the results of Experiment 1. In 
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keeping with Experiment 1, the Stage 2 error data indicates the difference in the response 
time data is not undermined by a speed-accuracy trade off as both outcomes produced a 
comparable (and relatively low) number of errors; thus indicating that whilst participants are 
able to learn the association involving the previously unpredicted outcome, the previously 
predicted outcome enters into associations more readily. The rating data corroborate this. 
Although both cues for the outcomes from stage 2 received positive ratings, participants 
provided higher ratings to the cue paired with the previously predicted outcome, than the cue 
that was paired with the previously unpredicted outcome. 
 
General Discussion 
 
Two experiments investigated whether an outcome’s prior associative history 
influences subsequent learning involving that outcome, when separated from the cue with 
which the outcome was first paired with. In both experiments, participants displayed a bias in 
learning towards a previously predicted outcome, with the predicted outcome entering into 
associations with novel cues more readily than the previously unpredicted outcome. Although 
Experiment 1 could be accounted for by appealing to the role of inhibitory learning 
established in Stage 1, the design of Experiment 2 ruled out this explanation, and replicated 
the effect observed in Experiment 1 both with response time measures and, in addition, self-
report ratings.  
These results are consistent with the findings of Griffiths et al. (2015) supporting their 
notion of a “learned predictability” effect within outcomes. In their study, Griffiths et al. 
(2015), employed a procedure in which participants were required to take on the role of a 
food allergist and identify which symptoms followed the consumption of certain foods in 
fictitious patients. In Stage 1 of their experiment, single foods (A, B and X) and compounds 
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of foods (AX and BX) were followed by two different types of outcomes (e.g. Stomach 
Reaction and Skin Rash), which each comprised a compound of symptoms. The outcome 
Stomach Reaction consisted of the symptoms cramping and bloating, whilst the outcome 
Skin Rash consisted of the symptoms itchiness and swelling. One outcome’s symptoms 
would be well-predicted (e.g. Stomach Reaction), with each of its symptoms (e.g. cramping 
and bloating) reliably predicted by cues A and B, whilst the other outcome’s symptoms (e.g. 
Skin Rash) would be less well-predicted, as cue X was equally predictive of either symptom. 
In Stage 2, novel cues (E, F, G, H) were reliably paired with the previously less well-
predicted symptom of an outcome and the previously well-predicted symptom of an outcome, 
and participants were required to predict the symptoms produced by the cues. The results 
demonstrated that participants better learned associations involving the previously well-
predicted outcome’s symptoms than the previously less well-predicted outcome’s symptoms -
a result consistent with the data from the two experiments reported here.  
Interestingly, two other studies may also be of relevance when considering the 
prospect of learned variations in outcome processing, both of which seemingly demonstrate a 
blocking effect among the components of an outcome. In a typical blocking procedure, pre-
training one component (A+) of a compound (AB+) impairs learning to the added cue (B) of 
the compound in a subsequent test (Kamin, 1968, 1969). However, in a series of experiments 
investigating second-order conditioning, Rescorla (1980, p 91- 97) investigated possible 
interactions among aspects of a reinforcer (or an outcome) and demonstrated blocking in an 
outcome. In the particular experiment of interest, pigeons were exposed to intermixed 
presentations of a cue (A) being paired with both a single outcome (‘O1’) and a compound 
outcome (‘O1 + O2’). As a result of these trials the pigeons demonstrated weak learning 
about the A-O2 association relative to a control group who received comparable treatment, 
but who had the A-O1 trials omitted. This led Rescorla to conclude that aspects of an 
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outcome compete for associative strength in the same manner as cues (see also: Miller & 
Matute, 1998 for a similar demonstration with rats).  
Thus, the current experiments, together with others (Griffiths et al., 2015; Rescorla, 
1980; Miller & Matute, 1998) suggest that a revision may be required to learning models 
which stipulate that β is a fixed learning-rate parameter. It is thus tempting to suggest that 
changes in attention/associability to both cues (α) and outcomes (β) are underpinned by 
comparable rules. For example, the algorithms suggested by Mackintosh (1975; see also: 
Esber & Haselgrove, 2011; George & Pearce, 2012; Le Pelley, 2004), for changes in cue 
associability could be applied to outcome associability. Such a suggestion immediately poses 
a conundrum, however. As noted in the introduction, it is relatively straightforward to see the 
adaptive purpose of a mechanism that varies the amount of attention that is paid to what are 
essentially neutral cues on the basis of their predictive significance. This mechanism permits 
organisms to tune out stimuli that are irrelevant predictors of important outcomes – be it food 
to a rat, or the goal of a computer-based task in a human – facilitating the acquisition of 
anticipatory behavior towards them. However, it seems less clear what the adaptive purpose 
would be of a mechanism that changes the attention paid to an outcome based on whether or 
not it has been well-predicted, for by the time the outcome is presented, it is too late. 
One way of resolving this conundrum is to suggest that events that share a predictive 
relationship, be they at the start or the end of a predictive chain, are inherently important. If 
organisms are conceived of as information foragers (Pirolli & Card, 1999; Pirolli, 2007; also 
see Melara & Algom, 2003) then an outcome that is well predicted provides more 
information about the structure of the world than an unpredicted outcome does, and therefore 
has more value - potentially increasing the attention it captures (e.g. Le Pelley, Mitchell & 
Johnson, 2013; Le Pelley, Pearson, Griffiths & Beesley, 2015; Pearson, Donkin, Tran, Most 
& Le Pelley, 2015). In addition, learning to shift attention between well-predicted and less 
29 
 
well-predicted outcomes might permit organisms to better modify their behavior when the 
predictive structure of the world changes. For example, consider the case of the parents of a 
child who have learned that whenever their child drinks milk she suffers with a stomach 
upset. If the child should subsequently have the same stomach upset despite not drinking 
milk, then it may stimulate the parents to search for potential causes of stomach upset in 
order to make sense of what was thought to be a well-understood world, but which has now 
become uncertain. In this sense, the mechanism is sensitive to uncertainty in a way that is, 
conceptually, similar to that proposed by Pearce and Hall (1980). 
A parsimonious explanation of the results obtained in the two experiments reported 
here appeals to context-blocking (Baker & Mercier, 1982; Randich & LoLordo, 1979). Here, 
an association is assumed to form between the unpredicted outcome (Z) and the experimental 
context as a result of Stage 1 training trials (F/G/W – Z) featuring the unpredicted outcome. 
Thus, in Stage 2, when Z is reliably paired with a novel cue, the context-Z association blocks 
(or competes with) learning about the cue-Z association. In contrast, however, the predicted 
outcome (X) was always preceded by cue P during Stage 1, which was a more reliable 
predictor than the context, thus reducing the likelihood of a context-X association forming, 
and obscuring learning when X is paired with a novel cue in Stage 2. 
One issue with this analysis, however, is the difficulty in ascertaining what 
constitutes the experimental context in this task. There could be a variety of features which 
form the experimental context (such as the background colour of the task and lighting), and 
the salience of these features are likely to differ between participants. Therefore, it is difficult 
to determine with any degree of certainty what constitutes the context in this experiment. 
That said, however, we can take some measure of the background expectation of Z by 
examining behaviour towards the stimuli, F, G and W. These stimuli are the most exposed 
stimuli in the experiment, as they are paired with each other to form non-target trials; thus, 
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participants must constantly monitor these stimuli in order to detect the target stimuli. It is, 
therefore, conceivable that these stimuli are the most salient feature of the context (or may 
overshadow any alternative feature of the context).  
Given this logic, the ratings provided for the F/G/W – Z pairings enables an insight 
into the strength of the association between this feature of the context and Z. Furthermore, if 
we look at the ratings provided for F/G/W - Z and correlate these with the size of the effect 
for each participant by subtracting the ratings provided for the S - Z association from the H - 
X association, we can also assess the extent to which this feature of the context was 
correlated with our effect of interest. According to a context blocking explanation it would be 
expected that greater learning about the F/G/W - Z association would result in poorer learning 
about the S – Z association. This analysis provides little support for this account, however, rs 
(27) = -.03, p= .43. Moreover, participants’ ratings of F, G and W, were relatively low (see 
Figure 6) and although demonstrating a trend toward significance, did not differ from zero, t 
(27) = 1.92, p = .07. 
Nevertheless, the presence of the F/G/W - Z trials could enable an alternative 
explanation. In particular, given that the target outcome Z has a greater number of associates 
in Stage 2 than X (as a result of the F/G/W – Z trials from Stage 1), it is possible that this 
resulted in some form of competition between the predictors of Z (i.e. F/G/W/S) in Stage 2. 
Thus impairing learning about Z relative to X. Furthermore, the presence of the F/G/W – Z 
trials in Stage 2 could indicate that rather than demonstrating some transferred learned 
predictability, the effect is dependent on differential concurrent predictability within Stage 2. 
That is, an outcome must be currently well-predicted by other stimuli in order for this 
outcome to enter into novel associations faster than a less-well predicted outcome.  
An alternative explanation for our results can also be developed if the contingencies 
in this task are viewed as instrumental as opposed to Pavlovian. For example, withholding a 
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response is required to  stimuli F, G and W on two-thirds of the trials with these stimuli; in 
which case it is possible to view the task employed here as a Go/No-Go (Donders, 1969). The 
inhibition acquired on the No-Go trials with  F, G and W may become associated with the 
outcome Z when it and F, G and W are paired – inhibition which will need to be overcome in 
Stage 2 in order for the S–Z association to  be expressed. Previous studies have demonstrated 
that stimuli can become associated with instrumental inhibition (see Bowditch, Verbruggen & 
McLaren, 2016; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). Although this analysis provides a potential 
explanation for the response time data recorded in Experiments 1 and 2, it seems less clear 
how this analysis would explain the differences in participant’s casual-ratings provided in 
Experiment 2 where a judgement about the relationship between H and X, and S and Z was 
required, rather than the performance of a speeded response. 
 In summary, two experiments examined how the prior predictability of an outcome 
influences subsequent learning involving that outcome. An assumption common to many 
associative models of learning is that an outcome’s associative history should have no 
subsequent influence on learning involving that outcome when it is separated from the cue 
with which it was trained. The current studies contradict this assumption and provide further 
insight into the nature of the effect and its implications for learning models. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1 – Example (target) trials for both Stage 1and Stage 2. Each trial lasted 4 seconds. A 
stimulus would first be presented, in this case a cue, followed by an inter-stimulus interval, an 
outcome, and finally a second interval. Participants were required to respond to the outcomes 
(X or Z) by pressing the respective keys, either when the target outcome appeared on screen 
or when they thought it would appear, if they could anticipate its onset.  
 
Figure 2 - Mean response times to the predicted (X) and unpredicted (Z) outcomes in Stage 1.  
Response times within the 2 – 3 second window indicate participants were responding to the 
outcomes as they were presented. If participants made a response before 2 seconds (signalled 
by the dotted line), they were responding prior to the presentation of the outcome.  
Errors bars show SEM. 
 
Figure 3 - Mean response times to the predicted (X) and unpredicted (Z) outcomes in Stage 2.  
Response times within the 2 – 3 second window indicate participants were responding to the 
outcomes as they were presented. If participants made a response before 2 seconds (signalled 
by the dotted line), they were responding prior to the presentation of the outcome. Errors bars 
show SEM. 
 
Figure 4 - Mean response times to the predicted (X) and unpredicted (Z) outcomes in Stage 1. 
Response times within the 2 – 3 second window indicate participants were responding to the 
outcomes as they were presented. If participants made a response before 2 seconds (signalled 
by the dotted line), they were responding prior to the presentation of the outcome. Errors bars 
show SEM. 
 
Figure 5 - Mean response times to the predicted (X) and unpredicted (Z) outcomes in Stage 1. 
Response times within the 2 – 3 second window indicate participants were responding to the 
outcomes as they were presented. If participants made a response before 2 seconds (signalled 
by the dotted line), they were responding prior to the presentation of the outcome. Errors bars 
show SEM. 
Figure 6 - Mean predictiveness rating (%) for the cues at the end of Stage 2. Errors bars show 
SEM. 
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Table 1. Design of Experiment 1  
Stage 1 Stage 2 
P – X,        P – X,       P – X P – X,         P – X,         P – X 
F – Z,        G – Z,      W – Z F –  Z,        G – Z,        W – Z 
F – H,       G – H,      W – H H – X,        S – Z 
F – S,        G – S,       W – S F –  G,       G – F 
 F – W,       W – F 
 G – W,      W – G 
Note. X refers to the predicted outcome. Z refers to the unpredicted outcome. P refers to the cue which 
reliably predicts the outcome X. F/G/W refer to the cues which partially predict the less well-predicted 
outcome Z. H and S refer to the stimuli paired with F/G/W to form non-target trials in Stage 1, and the 
novel cues of the outcomes X and Z in Stage 2.  
45 
 
 
 
Table 2. Design of Experiment 2 
Stage 1 Stage 2 
P – X,         P – X,         P – X P – X,          P – X,         P – X 
F – Z,         G – Z,        W – Z F – Z,          G – Z,        W – Z 
H – S,         S – H H – X,         S – Z 
F –  G,       G – F F –  G,        G – F 
F – W,       W – F F – W,        W – F 
G – W,      W – G G – W,       W – G 
Note. X refers to the predicted outcome. Z refers to the unpredicted outcome. P refers to the cue which 
reliably predicts the outcome X. F/G/W refer to the cues which partially predict the less well-predicted 
outcome Z, and also serve as non-target trials when paired with each other. H and S refer to the 
cues of the outcomes X and Z in Stage 2.  
